Constraints on Broker-Dealers Operating Outside Their Home Country by Miles, Richard N.
Journal of Compartive Cororate Law and Securities Regulation 4 (1982) 36-54 260
North-Holand Publisling Company
CONSTRAINTS ON BROKER-DEALERS OPERATING
OUTSIDE THEIR HOME COUNTRY
Richard N. Miles
MR. HAWES: We will now hear from Richard Miles. His topic
is one, I guarantee you, that no law professor in the U.S. could
adequately cover. Richard deals with this problem every day of the
week, and he can give us an interesting survey of the constraints
on broker-dealers--for example, Merrill Lynch--operating outside
their home country.
1. BROKER-DEALERS OPERATING ABROAD
MR. MILES: I have been asked to say a few words about the
legal constraints on broker-dealers (presumably based anywhere in the
world) when they operate abroad (presumably anywhere else in the
world); and I have to admit that at first I found such a broad assign-
ment a little daunting. However, it seems to me that one could at
least begin to get a handle on this subject matter by asking three
basic questions: (1) What broker-dealers are we considering?
(2) Where in the world would they want to go? and (3) What would
they really want to do when they got there?
A. Which Broker-Dealers?
In the important financial centers, broker-dealers probably
play the principal role in the securities business in only the U.S.,
England plus the Commonwealth, and Japan. This is true primarily
because only in these countries have they been effectively isolated
and/or protected from the banking community. On the Continent,
broker-dealers have little, if any, such protection. True, agents
de change do have a monopoly on the Paris Bourse, and they also have
a public customer base. But because they are prohibited from acting
as a dealer and have not been permitted to incorporate until recent-
ly, they have not been able to accumulate the capital needed to de-
velop a large retail base; and it has been estimated that perhaps
eighty percent of French stock exchange orders are transmitted via
the banking system. In Germany, carrying customer accounts for the
purpose of executing securities transactions is, as a matter of law,
exclusively a banking function. In the Netherlands, both banks and
brokers can be members of the Amsterdam Exchange, and the brokers
have managed to stay reasonably competitive. Nevertheless, overseas
operations tend to be pretty much the province of the commercial banks.
Of course, these so-called universal European banks have for-
eign branch networks themselves. These, together with the foreign
branches of the larger English, American, Canadian, and Japanese
banks (which all tend to become universal once they cross their fron-
tiers), obviously play a major role in the international securities
business. Although many of the legal and regulatory restrictions on
broker-dealers (set forth in some detail in the Appendix to this
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Chapter) undoubtedly apply also to the securities-related activities
of bank branches or agencies, I will address these comments only
to the activities of those non-bank broker-dealers whose off-shore
locations you will find listed in Exhibit 1. From this listing you
can see that I have already managed to reduce the broker-dealer home
countries to only four: the U.S., Canada, England, and Japan.
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B. Operating Where?
The next opportunity to pare the subject matter brings us to
Question #2 and the potential host countries to which these broker-
dealers would be interested in going. The question of which coun-
tries are interesting depends, of course, upon the availability in
each jurisdiction, or its multinational sales region, of prospects
for the opening of profitable accounts. In this respect, the pri-
mary determinant--and probably also the most important constraint on
broker-dealer operations throughout the world--is exchange control.
It is understandable, perhaps, that the last thing that a developing
country with a critical need for local investment, or an autocratic
government fearing the flight of capital, would want in its midst is
a brokerage office dedicated to the sale of foreign investments. It
follows that foreign securities firms are not found very often in
such countries or, absent special circumstances, even in developed
and more stable countries where governments still choose to maintain
significant controls over the wealth of their residents.
The more unlikely locations on the Exhibit 1 listing of for-
eign broker-dealer offices tend to be small, special purpose opera-
tions; often, in the case of the U.S. firms, handling exclusively
commodity-futures brokerage to meet the hedging needs of authorized
trade houses or government purchasing agencies. Other locations
may be solely investment banking offices, set up for the purpose of
developing local or regional financings. You will also find a num-
ber of offices in some developed countries with at least the appara-
tus still in place for exchange control. However, in the Netherlands
and Belgium, present practice creates no significant detriment to
foreign portfolio investment. In Japan, foreign investment can be
made freely, provided it is done through authorized securities com-
panies. In France and, until recently, England, exchange control
continues to operate; but the presence of large and often quite
wealthy expatriate populations (which are not internal for exchange
control purposes) have made retail broker-dealer branches feasible
and potentially very profitable.
(i) Initial entry techniques
My own firm has found commodity services by far the most use-
ful door-opener. "Commodity only" offices were our initial and, in
some cases, remain our only operations in Singapore, Seoul, Sgo
Paulo, and Taipei. Our second and, so far, successful attempt in
Australia is primarily a commodities venture; and, at various times
in its history, our Manila office has serviced only commodity cus-
tomers. On occasion, these offices may assist their firms in obtain-
ing under.riting or syndicate positions in local or regional financ-
ings. A next step may be permission to service the securities ac-
counts of those U.S. citizen or other alien residents who can main-
tain off-shore accounts. It may then be possible to develop limited
business with local institutions who may invest some of their assets
abroad. In Greece, we have assisted in organizing a local mutual
fund under an exchange control provision permitting a portion of its
portfolio to be invested overseas. Spanish mutual funds have similar
privileges, as did the English unit trusts. Eventually, the host
country may find itself in a position to do away with controls al-
together--as was the case in Singapore--at which point it is hoped
that the local office, having been there all along, will find itself
well positioned competitively.
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(ii) U.S. neighbors
In any event, these exchange control considerations, at least
insofar as the securities business is concerned, do serve to reduce
the list of important host countries to, perhaps, a dozen or so
(plus the oil producers), and it can be seen from Exhibit 1 that
representation appears to be achievable in most of them. There are,
however, two notable exceptions. Curiously (but perhaps not so
curious) these are the closest neighbors of the U.S.: Mexico and--
aside from a few grandfathered firms--Canada or, at any rate, the
key province of Ontario.
Although the Mexican peso is freely convertible, and the
authorities raise no objection to Mexican residents opening invest-
ment accounts while abroad, they very much discourage the active
solicitation of such accounts within Mexico. Any branch activity
or direct participation, even a minority interest, in a Mexican
financial institution would require the approval of the Banco de
Mexico; and I was advised only last fall that no such approval would
be forthcoming at this time.
Canada, of course, now presents the would-be visitor with two
hurdles: federal (the Foreign Investment Review Agency) and provin-
cial. The provincial restrictions are a mixed bag, but currently
there is an absolute bar insofar as Ontario is concerned. Canada
may be a useful starting point for consideration of question number
three; and that is, what do foreign broker-dealers really want to do
when they enter a given jurisdiction? it was only in Canada that a
really significant effort was made by a broker-dealer to enter a
foreign securities market for the purpose of selling local securities
to local residents in direct competition with the major factors in
that industry. That effort, of course, commenced with the acquisi-
tion of Royal Securities by Merrill Lynch. Although Merrill Lynch
Royal Securities is now a viable business, I would not be giving
anything away by suggesting that our management undoubtedly had some
second thoughts about this venture during the early going or by sug-
gesting that our acquisition was at least to some extent responsible
for the closed door policy which subsequently evolved.
C. What Kinds of Activities?
Much has been said about the need for reciprocity in the grow-
ing internationalization of the securities business. To many this
has been understood to include the free right of entry to local mar-
kets around the world by multinational securities firms. At the
business level, however, very few securities firms--including my own
since its Canadian adventure--have shown much interest in across-
the-board competition in foreign markets. To them reciprocity has
more often been identified with the highly valued reciprocal busi-
ness which they receive from those markets; business which, in all
likelihood, would not be forthcoming if they entered those markets
on a competitive basis.
Many firms with established positions in attractive investment
markets enjoy a significant inflow of orders from abroad. When their
orders into foreign markets, be they for customers or for their own
arbitrage account, are more than off-set by reciprocal orders from
local banks and brokers, they must give careful considerations, in-
deed, before they take any action that could be construed as direct
competition with their best customers. Nevertheless, as you can see
in Exhibit 1, there are 219 New York Stock Exchange member offices in
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thirty-one foreign countries; members of the Stock Exchange in Lon-
don maintain thirty-seven offices in twelve countries; and Japanese
securities companies have seventy overseas offices. What are all
these offices doing if they are not competing in the local markets?
As to the U.S. firms, I think it would be safe to say that they are
competing with each other and with the U.S. stay-at-home firms for
a larger slice of the order flow coming from those locations into
the U.S. markets. To a lesser extent they compete in the interna-
tional bond market.
Even after a securities firm has concluded that its primary
effort in a foreign country will be to drum up business for the ex-
changes back home, it has yet another marketing decision to confront.
Where it services the accounts only of local banks and brokers or
those financial institutions that are so big that they would bypass
local intermediaries and deal directly with the home market, the
firm is obviously not competing with its best customers. On the
other hand, if it should decide to go to the local public in order
to reach the end investor, order flow from these intermediaries
should be expected to decline. This marketing question is obviously
a critical one. Por the U.S. firms, it became a much more difficult
decision after the demise of the minimum commission; since the in-
termediaries, who collect end-investor orders and come to the U.S.
markets in size, obviously can negotiate commission discounts that
individual investors would not be able to command.
2. THE REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE
In any event, the drumming up of business for the home market,
be it from local banks and brokers or from the end investor, is
usually carried out through a legal vehicle; or perhaps more accu-
rately, a legal fiction known as a representative office. Although
primarily a fiscal concept, the representative office, or service
company structure, has also proven useful to many securities firms
in avoiding local banking and broker-dealer regulation. In the tax
context, a representative office encompasses virtually any activity
that does not create a taxable permanent establishment of the for-
eign business. A representative office may be either a branch or a
separately incorporated subsidiary. It can be a base for business
promotion and solicitation, and it is usually permitted to provide
services to both the foreign concern and that concern's local cus-
tomers. The representative office and its employees, however, should
have no authority to bind their home offices; and they should play
no direct part in the conclusion of transactions for the foreign
concern or its customers.
A. Tax Arrangements
Although it is arguable that under some tax regimes or trea-
ties a representative office has no local income tax liability what-
ever, in most jurisdictions it is the practice to negotiate a tax
regime with the fiscal authorities, providing for a notional taxable
profit expressed as a percentage of the representative office's
expenses--usually in the range of five to ten percent. The document-
ation would consist of an operating agreement whereby the home office,
or parent, agrees to compensate the representative office for its
services through a fee measured by agreed-upon expenses plus the
negotiated percentage. bly own firm has been successful in nego-
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tiating such arrangements in all of its foreign locations with the
exception of Austria, Italy, and Venezuela. In these countries
various income formulas based on commissions and credits generated
by accounts serviced by those companies have been utilized.
These expenses-plus arrangements do not necessarily result in
lower taxes. There is no opportunity for carrying forward start-up
losses; and it well may be that significant local taxes are incurred
on what would prove upon analysis to be a losing operation. None-
theless, chronic losing operations are not really tolerated in most
jurisdictions, and the expenses-plus regimes have the great advantage
of simplicity. Local auditors need only certify the expenses and
add on the profit percentage. Before concluding such an arrangement,
however, firms would be well advised to analyze the impact of local
value-added tax where applicable, as VAT of fifteen to twenty-two
percent on the entire service fee would be a rather unpleasant sur-
prise.
B. Activities Not Triggering Regulatory Controls
On the regulatory front, the arguments that support the ab-
sence of a permanent establishment are often successfully used to
claim that, as a matter of law, no broker-dealer or banking activity
is being conducted in the local jurisdiction. Although it is con-
ceded that accounts are solicited by the local office, they are said
not to be accepted there, but merely introduced to the off-shore
account carrier--which may either accept or decline them (usually
it accepts). By the same token, although orders are solicited, they
are neither accepted nor acted upon, but merely transmitted to the
foreign place of execution. Statements, confirmations, margin calls,
and other notices are said to be issued not locally but received
from the off-shore securities firm and simply transmitted to that
firm's customers.
In short, the local representative office is characterized
as nothing but a solicitation base and a communications facility,
retained by the foreign securities firm to promote its business and
make it more convenient for local customers to communicate with their
broker. These customers are in privity of contract with the home
office entity, and account documentation should reflect this rela-
tionship. New account forms should also be consistent with the pro-
position that the accounts are only being introduced. Above all,
customer notices and correspondence must be carefully monitored to
avoid the suggestion, especially by an employee's use of the first
person, that the actual securities firm is present in the local
jurisdiction. When using local letterhead, it must be the home
office that makes a correction or credits an account, not "we'. My
own firm was subjected to a full scale investigation by the German
Banking Commission largely because the Commission came into posses-
sion of a letter written by an account executive, advising a cus-
tomer that his account had been transferred from our London to our
Frankfurt office rather than advising him that the account had been
transferred to a New York ledger number for accounts serviced by the
Frankfurt office. Of course, carrying accounts is banking in Ger-
many.
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C. Home Country Constraints
If we accept the proposition that most of these broker-dealer
foreign offices are primarily bases for the solicitation of orders
coming back to their home markets, it should be noted that often it
is the home country's constraints that prove to pose the more seri-
ous problems in the development of off-shore business. Dividend
and interest withholding taxes around the world are an obvious ex-
ample. The Non-Resident Alien Estate Tax raises very serious mar-
keting and ethical problems for the U.S. firms when they try to talk
non-resident aliens into transferring their accounts to a U.S. cus-
todian. Many of them go so far--doubtless to the horror of the SEC
--as to actively encourage the establishment of foreign personal
holding companies, not to achieve anonymity but to avoid substantial
and unnecessary estate tax liability.
The perception of many investors that a U.S. custodian cannot
offer an adequately confidential customer relationship is another
major problem for U.S. brokers in the development of foreign busi-
ness. The investments in U.S. securities are probably made in any
event, but the orders come to the U.S. markets through foreign in-
termediaries who can offer, these investors think, the confiden-
tiality they require. As I have noted, such orders are subject to
pretty deep discounts.
In the Appendix that follows this Chapter, I have made some
notes about the general ground rules and some areas of peculiar
difficulty in many of the countries that appear to be of interest
to foreign securities firms. I have not included the tough exchange
control jurisdictions where broker-dealer offices, if any, must be
of the special purpose variety. These include Greece, Italy, Spain,
Portugal, Austria, Israel, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, India,
much of Latin America (with the exception of Venezuela and Argentina,
where broker-dealer representation is permissible) and, as noted,
Mexico.
The oil producing Arab countries, as well as Lebanon, have no
exchange restrictions and there are no particular regulatory diffi-
culties with representative offices, other than in Saudi Arabia
(which is more or less closed) and Kuwait (whose 1970 Securities
Ordinance effectively blocks the sale of mutual funds and includes
certain other troublesome provisions). Under the prior regime in
Iran, minority participation in broker-dealer operations, including
representational activity, was achievable. For the U.S. firms, at
least, any interest in a visible presence in the Republic of South
Africa appears to have been shelved.
3. THE GROW4TH OF SOME INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
A. The Equity Market
When I read over these notes it seems that this commentator
at leastdoes not sound very bullish about the imminent interna-
tionalization of the securities markets. We do have some reserva-
tions, but more with regard to the equity portion of the markets
than with the money markets. This is understandable and there are
a number of reasons for it.
The first reason is that equities are, after all, traded
largely on stock exchanges; and in most financial communities the
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exchanges still constitute the entrenched establishment. The second
is that an investor or trader really has to know a lot more about an
issuer to be comfortable with its shares than would be the case for
a debt instrument. The kind of information about these issuers that
investors expect and brokers must provide in the U.S. is simply not
available in many jurisdictions. The third is that governments in
most jurisdictions tend to be much more protective when it comes to
the ownership of their industries than they are about their debt.
That concern is understandable. There are limitations on foreign
ownership in Japan and in key industries in the U.S. Recently talk
about removing our withholding tax has focused only on interest and
not on dividends.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Do you think it would be healthy for American
companies to be raising equity abroad? Is that something we should
be taking affirmative steps to encourage?
MR. MILES: Yes, through the Eurobond market.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Equity?
MR. MILES: Oh, equity. I think it would be tough marketing;
certainly, the utilities would find it difficult. They are return-
related instruments, and if you are looking at a thirty percent
withholding tax ...
MR. Friedman: But if we wanted to encourage it, then we
would start looking at equities the way people are looking at debt
securities and perhaps drop the withholding tax.
B. The Money Market
MR. MILES: The money market part of the international markets
is becoming a lot more international. I think it is because money
is being recognized as a commodity; and, as I have said, the commo-
dity trade has considered its market as international for a long
time. With today's widely fluctuating exchange and interest rates,
no one contemplating a large financial or commercial transaction
can afford to ignore this exposure. The result that we have seen
has been a powerful market demand for nearly instantaneous execution
services in both debt and forward exchange markets, as well as in
currency and financial futures.
This demand is really not so much for an around-the-world
market as it is for an around-the-clock market. Few seem prepared
these days to wait until tomorrow to find out whether or not their
order was filled and at what price; and the response of many dealers
has been to set up trading desks in the Far East and elsewhere a-
round the world. Perhaps I could close these remarks by saying,
"Let us hope the equity markets will follow," but I suspect it will
take a few more years.
C. An Around-the-Clock Market
MR. HAWES: Thank you Dick. Chuck, did you want to comment
on this concept of the around-the-clock trading markets, and ar-
bitrage, and what questions that raises?
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MR. NATHAN: The interesting thing about those markets is
that they are growing every day. The U.S. firms and the foreign
firms are basically trading around the clock, and that means around
the world in the sense that they are passing the book.
MR. MILES: Chuck, I think really they are not passing the
book. They are passing the authority to trade the book.
MR. NATHAN: Okay. They are trading out of Hong Kong and out
of Europe, perhaps against a book physically located in New York,
but they are trading it around the clock.
In conversations I have had with the people who are doing
this, the interesting thing is that they see very few legal re-
straints or inhibitions on their actions, and it does not seem to
matter if they are trading in American equity securities. I under-
stand that after the close of the market there is a fair amount of
trading going on in Europe of American equity securities in a third
market, if you will, or a gray market that has a large participation
by American brokerage firms. That is also happening in the Far East.
European equities are being traded to resell back in New York or to
resell to other institutional customers somewhere else in the world.
This seems to be happening in some sort of gray market or third
market that is unregulated. The key is that everybody waits until
the primary market closes down, and then they trade like mad and
have a wonderful time.
On the other hand, I think the participants in these markets
do recognize that there is a principal market for virtually every
security and that the principal market drives the price. I speci-
fically asked one trader, "If a stock closes on the Amster-
dam market at whatever price you want to name, can you manipulate
it overnight, and get it up there in the morning, and make a nice
little killing?"
And he said, "No. The principal market is where the supply
and demand really is. That is where the liquidity is, and this is
especially true for U.S.-based equities. Anyone who tries to play
games is going to get his head handed to him sooner or later. We
are just guessing where the market is going to open, and we act as
if we were trading while the market is open. We trade on an unregu-
lated basis where we do not have to worry about access; it is just
good old-fashioned dealer trading."
This system seems to be picking up a lot of steam, and the
traders, at least, are comfortable with it. Looking at it from the
U.S. point of view, I do not see any great problems with it, as
long as we do not run into our 1933 Act fence by trading European
issued securities into the U.S. before it is legal to do so. The
hour of the trade does not matter; the SEC does not shut down at
five. There is no time-of-day qualification on SEC constraints.
We are talking here in terms of market, and access to market, and
who is doing what; and now, it seems, things are happening on a
twenty-four hour basis.
MR. MILES: Well, there certainly are some problems--fiscal
problems if nothing else. When you have one inventory being traded
by three or four different trading desks, how you find out the
location of the attributable income is a nightmare.
And there are regulatory problems. Right now we are talking
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to people in the Ministry of Finance in Japan about a trading desk
in Tokyo, and they go right to the heart of the matter. They say,
"Is not the U.S. broker-dealer, through an agent, already carrying
on an unregistered business in Japan?" But they are still consider-
ing the matter. We are talking back and forth to see if we cannot
come to some accommodation. As soon as you transfer the authority
to trade inventory, you have a regulatory problem in the place the
inventory is traded. So, there are real problems. As to money
market securities, the problems already exist today; they are not
"coming".
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APPENDIX XVI
RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY SPECIFIC COUNTRIES
Australia
Representative office tax regimes are acceptable, and accounts may be
introduced and orders passed to an off-shore account carrier, but only, as in
England, by holders of Securities Dealer Licenses which are issued by the
Commissioners of Corporate Affairs for the various Australian states under
their respective Securities Industry Acts. The posting of bonds is required,
but these licenses are generally available to responsible firms.
Upon approval of the Reserve Bank, Australian residents may undertake
portfolio investments overseas up to the following annual amounts:
(1) Individuals - A$40,000, including up to A$10,000 in eligible fixed income
investments (not short term or issues with less than 1 year to run).
(2) Substantial private companies - A$250,000, including up to A$100,000 in
eligible fixed income investments.
(3) Listed public companies and institutions - A$2,500,000, including up to
A$1,000,000 in eligible fixed income investments.
The annual period runs from July 1 to June 30, and, upon approval,
additional amounts may be invested in each such period. Once an overseas
portfolio investment has been made, it may not be dealt with without further
approval. If frequent switching is intended, the Bank will grant general
authority subject to periodic reporting requirements. Proceeds of sales and
income may be held for reinvestment abroad for up to one month and, if not
reinvested by then, must be repatriated.
lembers of an Australian stock exchange must be natural persons carry-
ing on business in partnership. With committee approval, they may have an
interest in or be a director of a limited liability company carrying on busi-
ness outside Australia as a member of a "recognized exchange" in accordance
with the rules of that exchange, but they may not otherwise be a director or
have an interest in any other company or firm (other than their own partnership)
engaged in the stock brokerage business. There has been no case of a representa-
tive of an overseas securities firm successfully applying for membership.
Membership on the Sydney Futures Exchange is available to foreign firms,
who thus are free to compete in the local market for commodity futures. How-
ever, the passing of orders to foreign commodity exchanges, other than for the
commodity trade, is not feasible for resident customers since they would not
ordinarily receive approval from the Reserve Bank to meet overseas margin calls.
Belgium
Belgian residents are free to invest in foreign securities and carry
investment accounts abroad without prior approval. There is a requirement to
report to the Belgo-Luxembourg Exchange Institute (IBLC) any foreign exchange
transaction needed to obtain the required currency (which must be done in the
free or financial franc market). These reports need only indicate the details
and the reason for the conversion, and they are usually filed by the banks
through which the transactions are made. There is no requirement to repatriate
proceeds, and reinvestments need not be reported.
Representative office tax regimes are generally accepted. However,
under the Belgian Commercial Code, it is illegal to receive orders to purchase
or sell securities unless one is either a Belgian bank or an agent de change
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and the latter must be an unincorporated Belgian national. The Code further
defines the receipt of an order as follows: "to collect (recueillir) such
orders in Belgium, either for one's own account, or for passing them on, in
any capacity whatsoever, in Belgium or abroad, even without a personal res-
ponsibility in the transaction". Nevertheless, although it certainly would
appear from the foregoing that Belgium was one jurisdiction where order passing
representative offices would not be sanctioned, what amounts to an administra-
tive tolerance has permitted their successful operation in Belgium for more
than a decade. The collection and passing of commodity futures orders are per-
mitted provided the office registers with a Commodity Exchange Commission (still
in existence despite the fact that there are no longer any Belgian exchanges)
and complies with certain confirmation requirements.
Belgium has very stringent laws dealing with colportage and demarchage,
which severely restrict the ability of representative offices to solicit cus-
tomer accounts. These are covered in detail in the notes on France.
Canada
There are no restrictions on foreign investment by Canadian residents.
Representative office tax regimes can be negotiated, and a number of foreign
broker-dealer branch or subsidiary representative offices have been established
in the various Canadian provinces.
At present, however, any foreign broker-dealer wishing to open up a
place of business in Canada will first require the clearance of the federal
Foreign Investment Review Agency, which must certify that the proposed operation
will be of "significant benefit" to Canada, presumably by providing needed
services not avai-lable from the existing securities industry. Our present
advice is that, at best, such clearance would be less than automatic. Even
having cleared the federal hurdle, a foreign concern would then face a more
difficult one if it were interested in the key province of Ontario and member-
ship on the Toronto Stock Exchange.
Regulations under the Ontario Securities Act, promulgated upon the 1970
Moore Report recommendations, have effectively blocked the registration of
foreign controlled broker-dealers in Ontario other than those originally grand-
fathered in 1971. Under the present Regulations (131/135), new registrations
are limited to applicants no more than twenty-five percent owned by non-residents
with no single non-resident having more than a ten percent interest. In addi-
tion, the renewal of grandfathered registrations (there are four still left, one
of them under review) is subject to Commission review of any changes in owner-
ship and capital as well as a finding that they provide a "material or unique
service to Ontario investors not substantially available to those investors
through other registrants". Although a 1979 report issued by the Securities
Commission suggested a limited registration for foreign controlled firms that
would permit them to act as a broker-dealer only with respect to transactions
in foreign securities with Ontario residents and to the conduct of activities
incidental to the sale outside of Canada of securities issued by Ontario entities,
no action has been taken on those recommendations to date.
Merrill Lynch Royal Securities Limited, one of the grandfathered firms,
carries its own customer accounts and deals with its U.S. parent only through
inter-company omnibus accounts. We understand that those firms not carrying
customer accounts and conducting only representational activities are neverthe-
less required by the Commission to maintain at their premises a full set of
customer account records.
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England
There are presently no exchange control restrictions. Representative
office tax regimes are accepted, but any establishment carrying on or purport-
ing to carry on the business of dealing in securities or wishing to distribute
circulars containing invitations or information likely to lead to the purchase
of securities mutt either obtain a Dealers License issued by the Department of
Trade or be a member of a securities exchange or of an association recognized
by the Stock Exchange in London.
Holders of a Dealers License must also register their individual sales-
men, but most U.S. and Canadian broker-dealers have taken advantage of the
licensing exception granted to members of the United Kingdom Association of
New York Stock Exchange Members or the Association of Canadian Investment Dealers
and Members of the Toronto and Montreal Stock Exchanges in Great Britain. Both
associations are run by U.K. resident committees, and, in general, their members
face little in the way of regulatory difficulties in carrying out either repre-
sentational or dealer activities. Association members are entitled also to
reduced Stock Exchange commission rates on their larger trades, which, although
available to the public customers of Exchange members, are not granted to most
other financial institutions, including holders of a Dealers License. Prior to
the unwinding of exchange control, both members of the Exchange or its associa-
tions and holders of a Dealers License were also accorded the status of an
authorized depository of the Bank of England, which permitted them to conduct
certain cashiering activities and to carry or service internal accounts wishing
to go through the premium market to make foreign investments.
Admission to membership on the Stock Exchange is at the full discretion
of its Council. Although there have been a few foreign individual members, no
banking institutions or overseas brokers have been admitted to date. Corporate
membership is permitted, but non-member interest in the capital of such a com-
pany is limited to a ten percent holding by each non-member shareholder, in-
cluding his associated companies and family, and all directors must be members
of the Exchange and assume personal liability.
The term "security" is narrowly construed as meaning shares, debentures
(or rights therein), U.K. and non-U.K. government bonds and rights under a
trust deed where the relevant property consists of securities. Circulars with
respect to mutual funds or unit trusts may not be distributed unless approved
by the Department of Trade, nor may circulars dealing with partnership interests
(such as oil and gas ventures) or other profit sharing schemes. Until recently,
security options were unattractive to U.K. tax payers since they were considered
wasting assets. However, security option transactions are now treated as capi-
tal events. Commodity futures remain unattractive as all gain is treated (under
Case 6) as ordinary income which cannot be set off against other losses.
London, of course, is the primary center of the international bond or
Eurobond market, and holders of a Dealers License and association members, as
well as the banks, can deal freely in these securities as well as in a more
modest third market for international equities. Most of these dealers are mem-
bers of the Association of International Bond Dealers, whose rules as to settle-
ment and the like, as a practical matter, tend to set the industry standards
despite the fact that it has no legal sanctions available.
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France
French residents for exchange control purposes include all French com-
panies, branches of foreign companies and, as to individuals, resident citizens
and foreign nationals after they have been resident for two years. Foreign
portfolio investments may be made by such residents and carried in accounts
abroad only with funds legitimately held abroad. They include:
(1) Funds or the proceeds of investments which were held abroad on November 25,
1968, the date when exchange control regulations were re-imposed after a period
of suspension during the de Gaulle regime.
(2) Funds or the proceeds of investments held abroad by an individual when he
was a non-resident.
(3) Funds transferred abroad by a resident under an authorization of the Banque
de France. The commonest of these items would be funds of foreign nationals
working in France, who are permitted to export their earnings upon proof of
payment of French income taxes.
Income on these securities must be repatriated through an authorized
bank or agent de change.
French residents may also purchase listed foreign securities with
internal funds provided they do so through an authorized bank or agent de change
and the securities are held by those entities in their name or in the name of
their foreign correspondent.
It follows then that the representative offices of foreign securities
firms (which are acceptable in France) are limited to servicing only those
French resident customers who have funds legitimately abroad, and that they
must deal through French intermediaries with respect to foreign investments
made with internal funds.
Foreign controlled banking institutions are permitted, but to be econo-
mically feasible there would have to be a reasonable prospect for successful
banking or investment banking operations. An agent de change is a semi-public
exchange or bourse official appointed by the government and must be a French
national. Originally, an agent de change could carry on business only in his
own name. It is now possible for agents de change to carry on business through
a limited partnership or corporation. However, there is a requirement that at
least one-quarter of the corporate capital be held by one or more agents de change.
Both France and Belgium have very stringent laws with respect to colpor-
tage (the door-to-door selling of securities for immediate settlement) and
demarchage (the regular solicitation of securities transactions at a residence,
place of work, or public place, or by mail or telephone). Colportage is for-
bidden altogether, and demarchage is permitted only by banking institutions and
by agents de change and their solicitors, all of whom are subject to specific
government regulation. The French penal provisions run from one to ten years
imprisonment and up to 180,000 francs in fines, and civil actions may be brought
for damages or recision. These laws severely limit the ability of the representa-
tive offices of foreign securities firms to develop business. Strictly speaking,
all business solicitation should be limited to the banks and agents de change
themselves, those prospects who come to the representative offices of their own
.volition, and prospects who have independently requested information about the
opening of an account. In practice, most brokerage offices in these jurisdic-
tions take the position that, once an account has been opened, it is all right
to provide that customer with investment suggestions by phone or at his home;
but on that score the provisions of these laws give us very little in the way
of comfort.
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Germany
There are no restrictions on foreign portfolio investment by residents,
but German investors appear to have a perhaps understandable preference for
investing in their own economy, and, as measured by NYSE activity, purchases
of foreign securities are relatively modest compared to other countries in
Western Europe.
Representative office regimes are achievable, but their activities
are rather more circumscribed than in most other countries. Under interpreta-
tions of the German Banking Commission, the mailing locally of confirmations
or contract notes and any cashiering functions carried out on behalf of the
foreign account carrier are considered prohibited banking functions. The con-
firmations, therefore, must be mailed from outside Germany, and German repre-
sentative offices can play no direct role in the settlement of transactions
through the transfer of funds and securities.
The German gaming laws represent a significant restraint on certain
types of securities transactions commonly conducted in other markets. Although
most of the case law has to do with commodity futures (other than bona fide
hedging by trade houses), most commentators would extend the gaming prohibitions
to put and call options on securities, and a 1978 supreme court case even
went so far as to hold that a short sale was an illegal wagering contract.
Essentially, this line of cases takes the position that options, specu-
lative futures contracts, and short sales lack commercial reality and, upon
analysis, amount to no more than bets on the market for the underlying security
or commodity. Unlike the courts in most of the common law countries (gaming
law problems tend to be a Protestant phenomenon), the German rulings do not
require the mutual intent of the parties to the contract not to exercise or
take delivery. Nevertheless, a considerable amount of speculative commodities
and option business is still conducted with German customers through representa-
tive offices and, I have been told, also through some of the German banks
(warrants traded on the German exchanges enjoy a specific exemption). The U.S.
brokers heretofore had taken some comfort from the understanding that although
these contracts were not enforceable in a collection effort in the German courts,
the customer was also barred from these courts in any action to get back his
margin deposits. However, in the 1978 short sale decision (this was a collection
case), the court held that the defendant was entitled to the return of his margin
deposit, raising the spectre, subject to possible jurisdictional defenses, of
customers throughout Germany selectively disavowing their losing trades.
The German Banking Law lists among those activities that constitute
banking and require a banking license both the "agency securities business" and
the "securities custody business", which when taken together make it pretty
clear that it takes a bank to be an account carrying broker, although a dealer
with no customer accounts could theoretically operate. Of course, there is no
reason why a foreign securities firm could not buy or organize a German bank;
at one time, Bache & Co. did have a German banking subsidiary, which was also
a member of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. However, the price tag is not incon-
sequential; minimum capital of DM6,000,O00, the services of at least two senior
German banking executives, and full compliance irlth detailed rules as to record-
keeping and segregation. The German bank would have to carry its own customer
accounts and, as I was once told by the Banking Commission, could not perform any
representational services for the accounts of a foreign (i.e., non-supervised)
entity. It would appear, therefore, that any decision to go the banking route to
obtain access to the German securities markets would have to be predicated on
the expectation of profitable banking operations as well.
Germany has a very comprehensive mutual fund registration procedure,
courtesy of IOS, which effectively blocks the sale of most foreign funds. Part-
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nership interests (such as oil and gas or real estate deals) are not considered
securities, and their marketing by a representative office would require the
obtaining of a commercial license under Sec. 34(c) of the Trade Law.
Hong Kong
Hong Kong has no foreign exchange restrictions, and representative
office tax regimes are available.
However, the Securities Commission, created by the 1974 Securities
Ordinance, has taken the position that a representative office director or
manager must register as a dealer, on behalf of his office entity, and that
each account executive must also register as a dealer's representative. Since
the Ordinance also imposes on registrants various record-keeping and segregation
requirements appropriate only to account carrying dealers, there is obviously
room for regulatory difficulties, especially should the Commission take the
position that the off-shore account carriers are dealing in securities in Hong
Kong through their agent and require them to register. However, to date the
unavoidable non-compliance with these requirements by representative offices
has resulted in no major confrontations.
Membership in either the Hong Kong or Far East Stock Exchange is avail-
able to responsible foreign securities firms, as is membership in the Hong Kong
Commodities Exchange. Representative offices handling commodity futures orders
and their personnel must also register under the Hong Kong Commodities Ordinance,
which is also administered by the Securities Commission.
Japan
Prior to the amendments to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control
Law and the abolition of tile Foreign Investment Law last December, Japanese
residents, other than some 120 financial institutions licensed to operate foreign
securities accounts, were obliged to obtain prior approval for foreign portfolio
investments unless they acquired them through licensed securities companies which
themselves had secured a blanket approval for handling such transactions from
the Ministry of Finance. The larger Japanese securities companies, including
those "branches" of foreign securities firms licensed as securities companies
under the 1971 Foreign Securities Dealer Law, have obtained such approvals, and
thus are free to solicit the Japanese public with respect to the opening of
accounts on their books for the purchase of both Japanese and foreign securities.
Since the Tokyo Stock Exchange rules permit membership only by Japanese entities,
and since only branches of foreign securities companies can be licensed under
the Foreign Securities Dealer Law, exchange membership would be technically
blocked even if the December exchange control relaxations did allow a direct
investment by a foreign securities firm in a Japanese company. On listed business,
therefore, the foreign branches must go through Exchange members--presently at a
fifty percent discount from non-member commissions. Otherwise, their participa-
tion in local markets is limited largely to the over-the-counter bond market,
since by law all trades in listed securities must be "exchange transactions".
However, under present administrative practices, these licensed foreign
branches can also service accounts carried by their off-shore parent or home
office for non-residents, Japanese residents who are not resident for exchange
control purposes (aliens, resident less than one year or less than five years
with respect to unrepatriated assets), or those Japanese institutions that are
permitted to have off-shore accounts. Unlicensed representative offices of for-
eign securities firms are also present in Japan, and presumably they can provide
similar servicing to those customers permitted to have off-shore accounts.
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Japanese securities companies are held stringently to those activities
for which they are licensed: securities brokerage, securities dealing, and
securities underwriting and distribution. They cannot be a commodity-futures
broker and cannot deal in securities options, which under Ministry of Finance
interpretation are not securities.
The Netherlands
With a few minor exceptions not relevant to most foreign securities
firms, no approval is required for residents to invest in foreign securities
or carry foreign accounts. A periodic reporting requirement at the discretion
of the Netherlands Bank has not been administered for some time.
Representative office regimes can be arranged. However, the Amsterdam
Stock Exchange, which performs various regulatory functions under the auspices
of the government, requires a written undertaking from the representatives
(i.e., representative office managers) of foreign securities firms to the effect
that they will not solicit or take orders from Dutch private persons, corpora-
tions, or institutions who are not members of the Association of Amsterdam
Stock Exchange Member Firms-which includes virtually all of the Dutch banks
and brokers. The result is that these offices, as to their securities business,
deal only with Dutch intermediaries, or with resident aliens, or non-resident
customers. There are no restrictions on commodity futures brokerage.
Foreign ownership of a member of the Exchange is not prohibited. How-
ever, there is a good deal of reciprocal arbitrage business coming from the
Amsterdam market; and, to date, foreign broker-dealer membership has been limited
to the affiliated European Options Exchange.
Singapore
There are no restrictions on foreign portfolio investments by residents,
and representative office tax regimes are recognized.
The Singapore Securities Commission has recently taken the position
that representatives of foreign securities firms and their salesmen, heretofore
exempted or, at least, overlooked, must now register under the Singapore Securi-
ties Industry Act of 1973. However, the Singapore Act is not potentially as
troublesome as the Hong Kong Ordinance-or for that matter the similar Malaysian
Act--in that its Accounts and Audit Sections, which include record-keeping and
segregation requirements, are applicable only to a dealer who is also a "stock-
broker", a term defined as a member of a Singapore Stock Exchange.
Membership on the Stock Exchange in Singapore is restricted to Singaport
nationals and partnerships, although restricted licenses have been granted to
two or three foreign firms which provide for access to the Exchange through
members on preferred conditions. Merchant Banking Licenses are also available
to foreign securities firms, who may then apply for a further Asian Currency
Unit License which allows for dealing in the market for foreign-currency fixed-
income securities (Asian-dollar market).
Switzerland
There are no restrictions on foreign investment, and representative
offices are recognized routinely.
However, there is an informal understanding between the Swiss Banking
Association and the foreign brokerage community restricting the solicitation
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of Swiss residents other than through banking intermediaries. The U.S. firms
are understood to be able to service resident U.S. citizens, and there is
undoubtedly a certain amount of competition for the many non-resident prospects
who come to Switzerland to conduct their financial affairs. There is no re-
striction on the foreign ownership of Swiss banks, but to date no foreign
broker-dealer has acquired a controlling interest, although White, Weld & Co.,
Inc. at one time had a substantial indirect interest in Clariden Finanz AG,
a Zurich banking house. It has been suggested that a controlling interest in
U.S. hands could raise difficult questions with respect to U.S. disclosure
requirements and the Swiss laws on bank secrecy and industrial espionage.
To do business in Zurich, a securities firm representative office must
have in its employ an individual who holds a so-called "B" License issued by
the Cantonal government. The licensee must be of Swiss nationality and have
had management experience with a Swiss bank or other financial institution,
and all holders automatically become "B" members of the Zurich Stock Exchange.
Although this membership does not authorize that firm to trade on the Exchange
(a privilege reserved to the "ring banks"), it does allow a fifty percent re-
bate on commissions.
In the late sixties and early seventies, Switzerland was a candidate,
although possibly a reluctant one, to be a center for the conduct of the in-
ternational bond business. Several major dealers set up trading operations
in Zurich and Geneva with a view to better servicing the needs of the Swiss
banking community, then believed to be the final resting place for close to
eighty percent of the Eurobond float. However, changes in the Swiss Stamp Tax,
effective July 1, 1974, and a tax court decision extending liability under the
prior law made the professional bond trading business in Switzerland almost
an assured loser, and the trading desks were moved to London.
United States
There are no current restrictions on foreign portfolio investments by
U.S. residents.
Provided they meet the necessary federal and state (blue sky) regula-
tory requirements, foreign securities firms (including foreign banks as to
their securities operations) are free to come to the U.S.; and, under the
Securities Act Amendments of 1975, U.S. securities exchanges must permit access
to any registered broker-dealer. Prior thereto, foreign controlled firms were
not eligible for membership on the New York Stock Exchange, although a number
had been admitted to regional exchanges. However, since the same amendments
also did away with the U.S. minimum commission structure, the queue for foreign
membership has not been long.
Apparently with a view to avoiding problems of incompatible U.S. and
home market regulations with respect to record keeping and location, segregation,
and the like, it appears that most, if not all, of the U.S. operations of for-
eign securities firms have been separately incorporated subsidiaries, dealing
with their home market parent and its customers only through so-called omnibus
accounts (i.e., intercompany accounts carried by each affiliate wherein the
ultimate principal is not disclosed). Public accounts serviced by the U.S.
entity are either carried on its own books, subject to U.S. requirements, or
introduced on a disclosed clearance basis to other U.S. broker-dealers. Although
these arrangements would appear to remove the parent company from the scope of
U.S. regulation, a continuing problem has been the provision in the New York
Stock Exchange Rules for Exchange inspection of the books of member affiliates
where necessary to insure the financial stability of the member. As these rules
obviously suggest a potential conflict with foreign law and practice--particu-
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larly those relating to confidentiality--a recent compromise tentatively
approved by the SEC provides for an independent inspection when a foreign
government official or attorney certifies that the Exchange's examination
would violate that country's law, custom, or business practice.
Although the law is not altogether clear, foreign broker-dealers with
U.S. customers who choose not to have a place of business in the U.S. probably
do not have a 1934 Act registration requirement, but they may well be subject
to the Act's antifraud provisions (See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519
F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975)).
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